Socio-Political Governance, Institutional Functioning and Economic Development
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15678/AOC.2017.1604Keywords:
growth, development, governance, institutions, conditional convergence, developing countriesAbstract
As macroeconomic stabilisation and structural adjustment policies have not been particularly successful, it becomes increasingly necessary to consider the role of additional economic parameters in the growth process. In this context, governance (the balance of powers, rational resource management, transparency of rules, involvement of civil society, etc.) has become inextricably linked to the analysis of the development of the countries of the South. Closely related to that of institutions, this notion of governance is a polysemous one. In spite of that, the concept of governance is currently the core question in debates about how international financial organisations use the idea of “good governance”. This paper examines the need for “good governance” as a prerequisite for growth and development for developing countries and studies the possibilities of economic convergence at the international level (i.e. developing countries catching up with industrialised ones) based on the influence of socio-political variables on local governance.References
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